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Abstract—The research effort on mobile computing has focused mainly on routing and usually assumes that all mobile devices (MDs) are 
cooperative. These assumptions hold on military or search and rescue operations, where all hosts are from the same authority and their users 
have common goals. The application of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) as open networks has emerged recently but proliferated 
exponentially. Energy is a valuable commodity in MANETs due to the limited battery of the portable devices. Batteries typically cannot be 
replaced in MANETs, making their lifetime limited. Diverse users, with unlike goals, share the resources of their devices and ensuring global 
connectivity comes very low in their priority. This sort of communities can already be found in wired networks, namely on peer-to-peer 
networks. In this scenario, open MANETs will likely resemble social environments. A group of persons can provide benefits to each of its 
members as long as everyone provides his contribution. For our particular case, each element of a MANET will be called to forward 
messages and to participate on routing protocols. A selfish behavior threatens the entire community and also this behavior is infectious as, 
other MDs may also start to perform in the same way. In the extreme, this can take to the complete sabotage of the network. This paper 
investigates the prevalent malicious attacks in MANET and analyzes recent selfish trends in MANET. We analyzed the respective strengths 
and vulnerabilities of the existing selfish behaviour prevention scheme. 
Index Terms— Mobile ad hoc network (MANET), Mobile Device (MD), Selfish Node (SN). 
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION 
ince the first form of wireless ad hoc networks in the 
DARPA packet radio networks in the 1970s, it becomes 
an interesting research entity in the computer indus-
try. During the last couple of years remarkable improve-
ments are made in the research of ad hoc networks. Due to 
its possibility to fashion and manage a network without 
any central management, MANET is characterized as the 
art of networking without a network [1]. The success of 
MANETs is however perilously tied to their capability of 
transporting a wide gamut of applications with varying 
Quality of Service (QoS) requirements and providing ser-
vice despite failures in the underlying network. Emerging 
applications from conventional to the social or commercia-
lized ad hoc networks are bringing new, less explored 
arena of challenges. Non cooperation among MDs is one 
of these and it is a serious threat to the very existence of 
such networks. This kind of problem was already noticed 
on peer-to-peer file distribution systems like in Gnutella 
[2], the number of sites providing valuable content to the 
network was a small part of the number of users retriev-
ing information. MANETs by their very nature are sto-
chastic – in part because of the random environmental 
conditions and mobility of the MANET nodes, and in part 
because of the scarcity and variability of resources. Energy  
 
 
conservation is a critical issue in MANETs, which have 
nodes powered by batteries only. Thus, the lust to pre-
serve energy, forces MDs to restrict use of their own re-
sources to carry traffic of others. Such MD is undermined 
by selfish behavior, where its actions increases benefit for 
that MD while decreasing the average benefit for all MDs. 
Current schemes of detecting MD misbehavior in MANET 
are mostly centered on using incentives [3], reputation [4] 
or  Game-based mechanisms [5] to achieve the desired 
effect of MDs cooperation. In an adhoc network one of the 
major concerns is how to increase the routing security in 
presence of nasty MDs. Section 2 presents a detailed inves-
tigation of the malicious attacks in MANET and as pre-
vention works as the first line of defense, a detail survey 
of various selfish behaviour prevention schemes is pre-
sented. Finally the discussion is concluded in Section 3. 
2 RELATED WORK 
ith growing popularity of MANET, it is becoming 
critically important to provide similar QoS to the 
users as they are accustomed to in networks with 
wired infrastructure. The most interesting difference lies 
in the fact that links are relatively unreliable, dynamic, 
and resource constraint in nature. Moreover, the unpro-
tected locations of wireless routers expose them to mali-
cious intrusions and environmental hazards, such as, 
thunder storms, lightening, etc., adding extra vulnerability 
in network operations. As a consequence of faults (natural 
and man-made), MANET might perform inefficiently and 
could be temporarily shut down in extreme cases. Limited 
resources and shared bandwidth lead to degraded per-
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formance in MANET comparing with wired systems. 
However, some resources are consumed quickly as the 
MUs participate in the network functions. Battery power 
is considered to be most important in a mobile environ-
ment. One of the major sources of energy consumption in 
the MUs of MANETs is wireless transmission.  An indi-
vidual MU may attempt to benefit from other MUs, but 
refuse to share its own resources. Such MUs are called 
selfish or misbehaving units and their behavior is termed 
as misbehavior [6]. A selfish unit may refuse to forward 
data packets for other MUs in order to conserve its own 
power.  
2.1 Misbehaviour in MANET 
The main assumption of the MANET routing protocols is 
that all participating MDs do so in good faith and without 
maliciously disrupting the operation of the protocol [7]. 
However, the existence of malicious units cannot be over-
looked in any system, especially in open ones like social 
MANET. Our analysis focuses only on network-layer 
threats and countermeasures and depth analysis brings 
into light new parameters of distrust and extends new 
definition of selfish behaviour. Nasty MDs have complete 
access to the communication link they are able to advertise 
false routing information at will and force arbitrary 
routing decisions on their peers [8]. Based on the threat 
analysis and the identified capabilities of the potential 
attackers, we will now discuss several specific attacks that 
can target the operation of a routing protocol in MANET. 
Location disclosure [9]: Location disclosure is an attack that 
targets the privacy requirements of MANET. Through the 
use of traffic analysis techniques [10] or with simpler 
probing and monitoring approaches an attacker is able to 
discover the location of a MD, or even the structure of the 
entire network. 
Black hole [8]: In a black hole attack a nasty MD injects false 
route replies to the route requests it receives advertising 
itself as having the shortest path to a destination. These 
fake replies can be fabricated to divert network traffic 
through the malicious node for eavesdropping, or simply 
to attract all traffic to it in order to perform a denial of ser-
vice attack by dropping the received packets. 
Wormhole [11]: The wormhole attack is one of the most 
powerful presented here since it involves the cooperation 
between two malicious nodes that participate in the net-
work. One attacker, say node A, captures routing traffic at 
one point of the network and tunnels them to another 
point in the network, say to node B, that shares a private 
communication link with A. Node B then selectively in-
jects tunneled traffic back into the network. The connectiv-
ity of the nodes that have established routes over the 
wormhole link is completely under the control of the two 
colluding attackers. 
Blackmail [12]: This attack is relevant against routing pro-
tocols that use mechanisms for the identification of mali-
cious nodes and propagate messages that try to blacklist 
the offender. An attacker may fabricate such reporting 
messages and try to isolate legitimate nodes from the net-
work. The security property of nonrepudiation can prove 
to be useful in such cases since it binds a MD to the mes-
sages it generated [13]. 
Denial of service: Denial of service attacks aim at the com-
plete disruption of the routing function and therefore the 
whole operation of the adhoc network. Specific instances 
of denial of service attacks include the routing table over-
flow [9] and the sleep deprivation torture [14]. In a routing 
table overflow attack the malicious MD floods the net-
work with bogus route creation packets in order to con-
sume the resources of the participating MDs and disrupt 
the establishment of legitimate routes. The sleep depriva-
tion torture aims at the consumption of batteries of a spe-
cific MD by constantly keeping it engaged in routing deci-
sions. 
 
Figure1. Misbehaviour in MANET 
2.2 Preventing Selfishness 
The misbehavior problem of certain MUs in MANETs has 
lead to techniques to prevent selfishness in MANETs, and 
this paper presents detailed analysis of the same as classi-
fication into three categories reputation-based schemes, 
credit-based schemes and game theory based schemes 
(Table 1-3). Reputation is the opinion of the public toward 
a person, a group of people, an organization, or a re-
source. In the context of collaborative applications such as 
peer-to-peer systems, reputation represents the opinions 
MDs in the system have about their peers and peer-
provided resources. Reputation allows parties to build 
confidence, or the degree to which one party trusts anoth-
er within the context of a given purpose or decision. By 
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harnessing the community knowledge in the form of 
feedback, reputation-based systems help participants de-
cide whom to trust, encourage trustworthy behavior, and 
discourage dishonest participation by providing a means 
through which reputation and ultimately trust can be 
quantified and disseminated.  Reputation-Based Scheme 
[15-20] works on the theme of detection of misbehaving 
MUs and their boycott from any communication. Each 
MU participates equally in the absence of any central ad-
ministration to collectively detect and declare the misbe-
havior of a suspicious MU. Such a declaration is then 
broadcasted throughout the network so that the selfish 
MU will be cut off from the rest of the network. Reputa-
tion-Based Scheme [17] contains two major modules, 
termed watchdog and pathrater, to detect and mitigate, 
respectively, routing misbehavior in MANETs. MUs oper-
ate in a flexible mode wherein the watchdog module 
overhears the medium to check whether the next-hop MD 
faithfully forwards the packet. Based on the watchdog’s 
labels, the path rater module rates every path and subse-
quently selects the path that best avoids misbehaving 
MDs. The drawback is complete reliance on overhearing 
of a medium that is already mysterious of noise and er-
rors, so it has been  found that the watchdog technique fail 
to detect misbehavior or raise false alarms in the presence 
of ambiguous collisions, receiver collisions, and limited 
transmission power. The CONFIDANT protocol [17] is 
another example of reputation-based schemes. The proto-
col is based on selective altruism and utilitarianism, thus 
making misbehavior unattractive. CONFIDANT consists 
of four important components—the Monitor, the Reputa-
tion System, the Path Manager, and the Trust Manager 
performing the neighborhood watching, MD rating, path 
rating, and sending and receiving alarm messages, over-
hearing technique. The scheme inherits the demerits of the 
watchdog scheme. The basic idea of credit-based schemes 
[21- 25] is “serve and earn.” Faithful MUs get incentives in 
terms of virtual currency for providing services to other 
MUs for efficient communication. When such MUs re-
quest other MUs for packet forwarding, the same payment 
system to pay for such services is implemented. The main 
hurdle in credit-based schemes is the need of extra protec-
tion for the virtual currency and/ or tamper-resistant 
hardware.  Sprite [23] eliminates the use of tamper resis-
tant hardware to stimulate cooperation among the selfish 
MDs. The need to have a central authority and falling 
short to consider malicious MD’s packet drop causes 
Sprite to be a non-generic proposal. Game theory based 
[26,27] scheme follow Nash equilibrium including two 
kinds of games namely Cooperative game in which play-
ers reach an agreement through communication and Non-
cooperative game in which players chase their own profit 
independently. GIFT (Generous TIT-FOR-TAT) each MU 
keeps track of the ratio of services provided to services 
taken. But it requires additional information per session 
leading to overhead. 
 3. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
MANETs are particularly sensible to unexpected beha-
viors. The lack of a common goal in open MANETs with-
out a centralized authority will make their maintenance 
tough: each user will attempt to retrieve the most of the 
network while expecting to pay as less as possible. In hu-
man communities, this kind of behavior is called selfish-
ness. We analyzed the different types of attacks in an ad-
hoc environment. While prohibiting selfishness shows to 
be impossible over a decentralized network, applying pu-
nishments to those that present this behavior may be 
beneficial. This position paper details the analysis of sel-
fishness prevention schemes for MANET.  
TABLE 1 REPUTATION BASED SELFISHNESS PREVENTION SCHEMES 
 
Selfish MD  pre-
vention  scheme 
Components Checkpoints and limitations. 
 
Watchdog & Path-
rater 
 Watchdog: Overhears neighbors’ packet 
transmission promiscuously notifies misbeha-
vior to the source MS by sending a message. 
 Pathrater: Collects notification and rates every 
other MS avoids unreliable MSs in finding a 
path. 
 Depends only on Promiscuous listening.  
 Selfish MDs are just bypassed and not punished. 
 Promiscuous mode doesn’t work with unidirectional 
link or directional antenna. 
CONFIDANT  Monitor: promiscuously observes route protocol 
behavior as well as packet transmission of 
neighbor MDs. 
 Trust manager: sends ALARM messages on 
detection of misbehavior. 
 Reputation system: maintains a rating list and 
a blacklist for other MDs. 
 Path manager: ranks paths according to the 
reputation of MDs along each path. 
 Uses both direct and indirect observations from 
other MDs. 
  Similar weakness as Watchdog & Pathrater. 
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CORE (COllabor-
ative Reputation) 
 Subjective Reputation: own observation on 
usual packet transmission 
 Functional Reputation: own observation on 
task specific behavior of neighbor MDs 
 Indirect Reputation: positive reports from other 
MDs 
 False Accusation: by malicious MDs is pre-
vented 
 MDs with bad reputation are isolated. 
 Aging factor with more weight on past observation 
hence slow reaction. 
 Reputation of MDs is not changed frequently, thus 
MDs temporarily suffering from bad environmental 
conditions are not punished severely. 
Friends & Foes  Friends: MDs to which MD is willing to provide 
service. 
 Foes: MDs for which MD refuses to serve. 
 Selfish: MDs that regard MD as a foe. 
 Friends -> Foes:  When the difference between 
the numbers of packets forwarded for each 
other, reach a threshold value. 
 Friends -> Selfish : When a neighbor does not 
fairly treated packets forwarded by MD A (pro-
miscuous listening). 
 Memory overhead. 
 Message overhead. 
Reputation Index-
ing Window (RIW) 
 Contrary to CORE, emphasis on current feed-
back items rather than old ones. 
 Keeps a MD from behaving selfishly for a long 
time after building up good reputation. 
 Arbitrary weight without theoretic base. 
TABLE 2 CREDIT BASED SELFISHNESS PREVENTION SCHEMES 
Selfish MD  
Prevention  
Scheme 
Components Checkpoints and Limitations. 
 
PPM / PTM   Packet Purse Model: Source loads Nuglets into 
data packets before sending them for the pay-
ment to intermediate MDs Intermediate MDs 
can take more Nuglets than they deserve.  
 Packet Trade Model: Intermediate MDs trade 
packets with the previous MD, and the destina-
tion finally pays the price of the packets Easy 
target of the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. 
 Require a secure hardware to keep MDs from tam-
pering the amount of Nuglets. 
Sprite 
Simple, cheat-
proof, credit 
based system 
 CCS (Central Authorized Server)- MDs send 
CCS a receipt for every packet they forward, 
CCS gives credits to MDs according to the re-
ceipt. 
 Scalibility is major obstacle. 
 Message overhead 
Ad hoc-
VCG(Vickery, 
Clarke and 
Groves) 
 
 Route Discovery- Destination MD computes 
needed payments for intermediate MDs and no-
tifies it to the source MD or the central bank. 
 Data Transmission- Actual payment is per-
formed in this phase. 
 Totally depends on destination MD’s report. 
PIFA (Protocol 
independent 
Fairness Algo-
rithm) 
 
 Credit Manager (CM): manages the credit data-
base. 
 MD: who has the maximum energy 
 Base station or sink MD  
 Compatible to any routing protocol. 
 Message processing overhead in CM 
TABLE 3 GAME THEORY BASED SELFISHNESS PREVENTION SCHEMES 
Selfish MD  
prevention  
scheme 
Components Checkpoints and limitations. 
 
GIFT (Generous 
Tit For Tat) 
 Pursues energy consumption fairness for a ses-
sion as a unit low complexity.  
 For every session, MDs try to balance between 
service provided to them and service provided 
by them. 
 Help received + delta > Help given  Each MD needs 
sufficient information about an entire system, e.g., 
the number of MDs, energy constraints of them, 
and request for each session 
CATCH  Anonymous Challenge Message (ACM): Ano-
nymous ACM messages with sender ID hidden 
 MD should have at least one connection to send its 
own packet, so it has no choice but acknowledge 
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are sent by tester to check connectivity of tes-
tee. 
 Anonymous Neighbor Verification (ANV): In 
the ANV phase, a tester sends a cryptographic 
hash of a random token and releases the secret 
token to it if testee is good. 
all anonymous messages 
 No proof for evolutionary stability 
SLAC  Compares its performance against other MDs 
Based on a repeated game.  
 Prisoner’s dilemma in P2P networks. 
 Fair comparison of MD performance required 
Incentive Sche-
duling 
 Centrally managed and provide more time slots 
and power for relay MDs than non relay MDs 
 Relay MD actually not relaying packets 
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